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Abstract 
 
In this paper we present a model of an organization where agents can choose between 
productive and rent-seeking activities. We consider two governance institutions, single 
ownership and corporate governance or parliament rule. Applications include models of internal 
organization of a firm, of a kingdom ruled either by an absolute monarch or by the parliament, 
and location where agents can locate either in the court and become rent-seekers, or in an 
industrial city and become entrepreneurs. Our main goal is to study the size of rent-seeking 
activities under the two governance regimes. Under single ownership, rent-seeking reflects the 
taste of the owner for such activities and the possibilities of extracting rents from productive 
agents (who finance rent-seeking). The main conclusion of the paper is that, under corporate 
governance, the size of the rent-seeking sector may be larger than under single ownership 
despite the fact that in the former nobody has an intrinsic taste for rent-seeking 
activities.\pagebreak 
 
 
1   Department of Economics. Universidad Carlos III E-mail: lcorchon@eco.uc3m.es 
 
 
 
* I am grateful to S. Battilossi, C. Beviá, P. Fraile, C. E. García, S. Houpt, B. Moreno, P. Revilla, the participants 
in seminars at universities Carlos III (Economic History) and Autónoma de Barcelona for helpful comments and 
to CICYT under grant BEC2002-02194 and to BBVA for financial support. 
 
1. Introduction
In this paper we present a model of an economy where productive and unpro-
ductive (rent-seeking) activities coexist. The paper studies how different forms of
governance affect the relative size of productive and rent -seeking activities. We
assume two forms of governance, single ownership, where decisions are taken by
a single agent and corporate governance or parliament rule, where decisions are
taken by majority voting. There are several motivation for our work.
1: History. In Europe from the XVII century on, some countries devel-
oped a strong productive structure and were ruled by a parliament (e.g. Nether-
lands and Great Britain) while others (e.g. Spain and other southern countries)
concentrate efforts in rent-seeking activities devoted to obtain monopoly rights,
noble titles etc. from the absolute monarch. According to some, ”Absolutist
states.......such as early modern Spain, created economic conditions that retarded
long-run economic growth” (North and Weingast [1989]) and conversely, strong
economic performance was the effect of the rule of parliament. The question here
is the explanation of the connection between forms of governance and economic
performance.
2: Location. In some countries there is a stark contrast between industrial re-
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gions/cities (e.g. Milan, Barcelona) and the capital of the nation (Roma, Madrid).
The folklore attaches to the former the role of an industrious, exploited people and
to the latter the role of exploitative, tax-setters and rent-seekers. The question
here is how governance institutions affect the relative size of the industrial region
with respect to the capital.
3: Governance of a firm. In this case there are two types of regimes: Single
ownership and corporate firms in which owners are reduced to the role of powerless
suppliers of an input (Berle and Means [1932]). In the latter, decisions are taken
by majority voting by managers in the Board of Directors. Managers can hide
profits from shareholders and divert them to finance the activities of rent-seekers.1
In this paper we provide a model that, hopefully, encompasses all these situa-
tions. Our basic idea is that rent-seeking inside an organization is an equilibrium
phenomenon whose size is determined by the relative profitability of rent-seeking
and alternative activities. Thus, on top of the welfare loss created by taxes, we
have an extra welfare loss caused by the diversion of potentially useful talent into
the unproductive sector. The latter idea was explored by Murphy, Shleifer and
Vishny (1991) and Acemoglu (1995). However, they do not focus on the role of
1In our model, asymmetric information between shaholders and managers does not shape the
organization (as happens in other models of corporate finance, see e.g. Tirole [2001]). It just
allows rent-seekers managers to divert profits from the shareholders.
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different kinds of governance, which is the center of our analysis. We also as-
sume imperfect competition. This creates an extra welfare loss not contemplated
by these papers, namely that an increase in the rent-seeking sector increases the
degree of monopoly in the productive sector (see our comments below equation
(2.1’)).
We first model single ownership. Here there are three classes of agents: the
owner, who collects taxes and provides the prize (which is the good sought by
rent-seekers), workers who provide labor, and active agents, who might either do
rent-seeking or organize production. Free entry in rent-seeking and productive
activities determines the number of active agents in each activity. In the case
of a kingdom this means that the noble may be either courtier or entrepreneur.
In the case of a firm this means that managers can either direct a division of
the firm or devote their time to unproductive activities at the top, i.e. being
members of a (fictitious) council of advisors. Given an allocation of active agents,
the owner chooses a tax rate that maximizes his income. These taxes finance the
consumption of the owner and the prize. Given a tax rate, entrepreneurs maximize
profits and rent-seekers choose efforts to maximize payoffs (in an attempt to obtain
the prize). An equilibrium is a situation where all agents maximize.2 We prove
2The game is played sequentially. Hence, our concept of equilibrium is subgame perfection,
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that such an equilibrium exists, it is unique and stable (Propositions 1 and 2).
We also study the determinants of the relative importance of the rent-seeking
sector. We find that under certain conditions on the form of demand functions,
an exogenous technological progress can decrease the relative size of the rent-
seeking sector (Remark 1). Thus, the rent-seeking sector may decrease for reasons
independent of governance.
Next, we move to an organization in which the decision about the tax rate is
taken by majority voting in a parliament composed of all active agents. Thus, the
owner disappears and with him the taste for rent-seeking and his consumption
(i.e. all taxes are devoted to financing the prize). We will call this organization
corporate governance or parliament rule. In the case of a kingdom, the interpreta-
tion is that, in the beginning, parliaments were mainly populated by owners and
nobility. In the case of a firm, the parliament is the Board of Directors (BOD).
The BOD is composed of representatives of the production side, whom we will call
entrepreneurs, and other members that are potential rent-seekers. The suppliers
of the input can be interpreted as shareholders supplying capital. Rent-seeking
possibilities still exist under parliamentary rule. We assume that a prize might
be awarded, provided the necessary taxes are voted on the parliament. We find
i.e. in each stage agents assume that all agents will behave rationally in the rest of the game.
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that there are, at least, two equilibria. In one of those, rent-seeking activities
disappear because the parliament is composed entirely of entrepreneurs and their
most preferred tax rate is zero (Remark 2). But in another equilibrium the par-
liament is dominated by rent-seekers that vote on a tax rate that maximizes total
revenue. This tax coincides with the tax set by a single owner. We provide several
conditions under which the latter equilibrium exists (Propositions 3 and 4). In
this equilibrium, the number of rent-seekers is larger than under single ownership
because taxes are now entirely devoted to producing the prize. Consequently, in
this equilibrium, the number of entrepreneurs falls, the price of the production
rises and the welfare of workers/shareholders falls with respect to the equilibrium
level under single ownership (Proposition 5).
Finally we deal with equilibrium selection, i.e. with the question of which par-
ticular equilibrium actually occurs. With the historical interpretation in mind,
we assume that when the single owner is deposed, the existing active agents vote
in a provisional parliament about taxes and, thus, they select a particular equi-
librium. We see that under not unreasonable conditions they select the tax that
maximizes income (Proposition 6). All these results point out that the existence
of a parliament is not a sufficient condition for promoting the relative size of the
productive sector.
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Summing up, in our model, the existence of a parliament is neither a necessary,
nor a sufficient condition for rent-seeking to vanish. Moreover the size of rent-
seeking might be larger under corporate governance, where nobody has intrinsic
taste for rent-seeking, than under single ownership where the owner likes rent-
seeking per se. Of course, our results are based on a particular model. We do
not know if a change in our assumptions on the nature of taxes or rent seeking
activities, etc., would produce similar results. Thus, the best way of looking at
our result is that it is a robust counterexample to the theory that parliament and
productive activities go hand by hand.
Finally, in our paper, neither external competition, nor incentives play any
role. Without denying the importance of these two forces in shaping the nature
of organizations the paper is written in the belief that internal conflict is also an
important determinant of the shape of organizations. Of course all our conclusions
are provisional, until a model with all the necessary ingredients is developed.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 deal with the model and the
results that are derived from it. The paper ends with a section of conclusions which
comments on our assumptions and offers some suggestions for future research.
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2. The Model
The organization produces two kind of goods: The good that is subject to
rent-seeking, that we will call the prize (a position in the board of directors/a
duchy) and the differentiated good produced by the organization. There is a sole
input (labor/money) whose price is normalized to one.
The owner (absolute king) collects revenues from the productive units by
means of a tax on output. In the case of a firm we might think of this tax as a
royalty fee for the transfer of technology to the divisions. See the final section for
a discussion of this assumption. Let t be the tax rate. The owner transforms part
of taxes in the prize.3
There are N active agents who either organize the production inside the or-
ganization, call them entrepreneurs, or become rent-seekers.4 Suppose that there
are m entrepreneurs (later on we will explain how m is determined). Each en-
trepreneur produces a differentiated good and faces an inverse demand function
of the following form,
3The single owner can be thought of an aggregate of many shareholders with identical tastes.
4In our model only the owner can set taxes. For a model where active agents can set taxes
too see Rosenthal (Bates et alia, [1998]).
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pi = a− b(xi + θ
X
j 6=i
xj)α − t, with a ≥ 0, α > −1, bα > 0, and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
θ measures the degree of product differentiation. The slope of the demand function
is determined by the sign of −αb and thus, it is negative. The parameter α is a
measure of the curvature of demand function (inverse demand function is concave
iff α ≥ 1). b is an inverse measure of the size of the market since the maximum
consumption of the good obtains when xi = ((a − t)/b)
1
α ). Notice that if α = 1
and b > 0, the inverse demand function is linear and if a = 0, b < 0, α < 0, the
demand function is isoelastic with elasticity −α.
There are two interpretations of the model. Under partial equilibrium, these
demand functions are exogenously determined. This interpretation fits into the
firm model. Under general equilibrium, these demand functions are derived from
the maximization of utility of a representative worker who supplies labor, pays
taxes and consumes the goods produced.5 This interpretation fits better in the
model of a kingdom.
5If, for simplicity, we assume that the product is homogeneous, the preferences of the worker
are representable by the following utility function:
u = ax− bx
α+1
α+ 1
− l, where x ≡
X
xi and l is leisure.
The budget constraint is px+ tx = l. The first order condition of utility maximization yields
the function in the main text (second order condition holds since −bwαxα−1 < 0).
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Each entrepreneur has access to assets (i.e. technology) that allow him to
convert one unit of the input in 1/g units of product. Thus, 1/g is the productivity
of the input in the productive sector. We will assume that (a− g)/b > 0. In the
linear case it means that the marginal cost is below the maximum price that the
worker is willing to pay. In the isoelastic case, it means that the marginal cost is
positive.
If entrepreneur i produces xi and competitors produce
P
j 6=i xj, profits for i,
denoted by Bi, are:6
Bi ≡ (a− b(xi + θ
X
j 6=i
xj)α − t− g)xi
We assume that collusion possibilities are exogenous. Firm i maximizes
Bi+ γ
P
j 6=iBj, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. If γ = 0 the entrepreneurs act independently (i.e. the
firm is divisionalized). If γ = 1 aggregate profit equals individual profit and the
production sector is a team. Notice that the tax can also be interpreted as the
revenue raised by the headquarters of the organization as a percentage of direct
costs, a standard practice among diversified corporations.
6If this model is interpreted as a general equilibrium model, profits are spent in the market
for the numeraire good, i.e., labor is used either as domestic services or to produce domestically
a good consumed by entrepreneurs.
11
We assume that firms are quantity-setters. First order conditions (FOC) of
profit maximization for i = 1, 2, ...,m are
a−t−g−b(xi+θ
X
j 6=i
xj)α−αb(xi+θ
X
j 6=i
xj)α−1xi−γαbθ
X
j 6=i
xj(xj+θ
X
r 6=j
xr)α−1 = 0,
It can be shown that second order conditions hold and the system of FOC has
only symmetric solutions. At the unique equilibrium, output and prices are
xi = (
(a− g − t)(1 + θ(m− 1))1−α
b(1 + θ(m− 1) + α(1 + γθ(m− 1)))
1
α . (2.1)
pi =
α(a− t− g)(1 + γθ(m− 1))
1 + θ(m− 1) + α(1 + γθ(m− 1)) + g. (2.1’)
We see that a − g is a measure of the profitability of production. Since
equilibrium is symmetric, let us denote the market price by p. Tedious calculations
show that the degree of monopoly (p−g)/p is decreasing withm. Thus an increase
in the number of rent-seekers (= N −m) increases the degree of monopoly.
Let n (= N − m) be the number of rent-seekers. Let V be the value that
they attribute to the prize. Rent-seekers must exert effort in order to attract the
attention of the owner. Let Gi be the effort (time spent nearby the owner, cost of
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banquets, etc.) made by the rent seeker i. The probability that i gets the prize is
σi =
GiPn
j=1G

j
,  ∈ [0, 1].
The parameter  is a measure of the responsiveness of σi to efforts.7 If  = 0,
σi = 1/n. If  = 1 we have the function proposed by Tullock (1980). σi can also
be interpreted as the fraction of the prize obtained by i.
We assume that effort has a cost Ci = cGi, c > 0. Thus, payoffs for i are
Πi =
GiPn
j=1G

j
V − cGi.
Given V and n each rent-seeker chooses effort in order to maximize payoffs taken
as given the effort of other rent-seekers. FOC of payoff maximization are
G−1i
Pn
j=1G

j − G−1i Gi
(
Pn
j=1G

j)
2
V = c, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
It is easy to see that the second order condition holds and that the system above
7See Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992).
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only includes symmetrical solutions.8 This yields,
Gi =
(n− 1)V
n2c
. (2.2)
Πi =
V (n− (n− 1))
n2
. (2.2’)
The owner is the producer of the prize. His utility function is U = (
Pn
i=1Gi)
βC1−β,
0 < β ≤ 1 where C is his consumption of the numeraire.9 We assume that the
prize is produced from the input under constant returns to scale. Let e (> 0) the
marginal (and average) productivity of the input in the production of the prize.
An interpretation is that the prize consists of the value of the input plus the pres-
tige given by the status achieved with the prize. In this case, e > 1 reflects the
value added by the status.10 Also e reflects the degree of law enforcement of the
laws that provide a legal cover for the prize owner.
Taxes can be spent either on C or in the production of the prize. Hence
C +V/e = T . Taxes are set by the owner. The maximization of his utility can be
8The introduction of collusion among rent-seekers does not change the results significatively.
For instance if each rent-seeker maximizes Πi+η
P
j 6=iΠj , 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, we have that the equations
in the main text hold with  substituted by (1− η).
9In the case of an absolute king, labor consumption can be interpreted as domestic services
and/or domestic production performed by the worker.
10Thus, in the case of a kingdom the prize may be a duchy that is just an amount of labor
allocated to the Duke plus the prestige given by this title. For the sale of titles against revenue
in England in the early XVII century see North and Weingast (1989), p. 811.
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made in two steps. First the owner maximizes T and, later on he decides how to
divide his income between C and V .
Let us first analyze the maximization of T . We assume that when the owner
maximizes T he assumes that the number of rent seekers is given. In the kingdom
model, this may be interpreted as saying that agents can not change occupation,
only the descendents -perhaps involving an adequate marriage. Under this in-
terpretation agents are families. In the location interpretation, this assumption
can be motivated by the fact that entrepreneurs and rent-seekers live in different
parts of the country and that relocation is costly. In the model of a firm, the
assumption means that changing profession involves a high transaction cost. In
any case, the decision to enter one of the two activities is a long run decision that
is not influenced by changes in the tax rate. Given that T = t
Pm
i=1 xi, we get
T = t(
(a− g − t)(1 + θ(m− 1))1−α
b(1 + θ(m− 1) + α(1 + γθ(m− 1)))
1
αm.
The above equation is the Laffer curve of our economy. Maximization of T
amounts to choose a t ∈ [0, a−g] in order to maximize t(a−g−tb )
1
α (t ≤ a−g because
production must be non-negative, see (2.1)). Given that the objective function is
continuous and t belongs to a compact set, the maximum exists. Clearly, this
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maximum can not be located at the extremes, where T = 0. So the maximum
must be located at FOC, i.e.
(a− g − t) 1α (1− tb
αb(a− g − t)) = 0.
There is only one value of t that solves the previous equation and yields
positive revenue, namely
t∗ =
α(a− g)
1 + α
. (2.3)
Notice that t∗ belongs to [0, a − g] because t∗ > 0 since αb > 0 and a−gb > 0
and t∗ < a−g because α/(1+α) < 1. Denote by T¯ the taxes levied.11 Now let us
turn to the distribution of T¯ between consumption of the numeraire and the prize.
We assume that the owner correctly anticipates the efforts made by rent-seekers
as a function of V and hence U = (
Pn
i=1Gi)
βC1−β = ( (n−1)Vnc )
β(C)1−β. Thus, the
utility function can be re-written as U = V βC1−β. The maximization of utility
given T¯ yields C = T¯ (1− β) and V = eβT¯ .
Finally, we assume that active agents can freely enter into rent-seeking or
11It can be shown that
T¯ =
α(a− g)
1 + α
(
(a− g − t)(1 + θ(m− 1))1−α
b(1 + α)(1 + θ(m− 1) + α(1 + γθ(m− 1)))
1
αm.
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production activities. However, once they have entered in an activity, this choice
can not be reversed. Assuming for simplicity that n and m are real numbers, free
entry implies that
Bi = Πi. (2.4)
Now we can write the definition of an equilibrium:
Definition 1: A single ownership organization is in equilibrium if :
1. No active agent wants to switch occupation, i.e., (2.4) holds for n+m = N.
2. Given n and m, the owner maximize tax revenues, i.e. (2.3) holds.
3. Given n and V, rent-seekers maximize payoffs, i.e. (2.2) holds.
4. Given t and m, the product market is in equilibrium, i.e. (2.1) holds.
The game is played in three stages. In the first, active agents decide if they
produce or become rent-seekers. In the second, the owner maximizes revenues
and builds the prize. In the last stage, the prize is allocated and production takes
place. The equilibrium of the single ownership is a subgame perfect equilibrium
where, in each moment agents assume that other agents will act optimally in the
rest of the game.12
Consider now corporate governance. Here there is a parliament (board of
12If the model is interpreted as a general equilibrium model, since Walras law holds, the
market for the numeraire good is in equilibrium as well.
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directors) that is composed of all active agents that decide the tax rate by majority
voting. The owner is now a constitutional king (a CEO). He receives an stipend
that for simplicity we assume is zero. As before, there is a prize, which is produced
by the input and this prize is awarded by means of a lottery.13 In this set up,
rent-seeking is organized by the rent-seekers and efforts are wasted.14
The new equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 2: A corporate governance organization is in equilibrium if :
1. No active agent wants to switch occupation, i.e., (2.4) holds for n+m = N.
2. Given n and m, the parliament decides about t by majority voting.
3. Given n and V, rent-seekers maximize payoffs, i.e. (2.2) holds.
4. Given t and m, the product market is in equilibrium, i.e. (2.1) holds.
This new equilibrium is identical to that of a single ownership except that
taxes are voted by the parliament.
13Another interpretation is that taxes are devoted to producing a good that is exported and
the mechanism by which the production is assigned is regarded as random by rent-seekers.
14Another interpretation is that the owner is still able to receive efforts of rent-seekers and to
assign the prize provided the parliament has voted on the necessary taxes. Under this interpre-
tation, the owner is still as an organizer of rent-seeking but his consumption is severely limited
with respect to what he enjoyed under single ownership.
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3. Results
Our first result is the following:
Proposition 1: There is a unique equilibrium for the single ownership.
Proof: Since Bi = (p− g)xi, equations (2.2’) and (2.4) imply that
(p− g)xi =
eβtx(n− (n− 1))
n2
or n2(p− g) = eβt(n− (n− 1))m.
Since t∗ = α(a−g)
1+α , from (2.1’) we obtain that
t∗
p− g =
1 + θ(m− 1)
1 + γθ(m− 1) + α.
Simplifying and taking into account that m = N − n,
n2
eβ(n(1− ) + ) −
(N − n)(1 + θ(N − n− 1))
1 + γθ(N − n− 1) − α(N − n) = 0. (3.1)
The left hand side of (3.1) is positive for n = N and negative for n = 0. Hence,
there is a value of n such that (3.1) holds. Such value is unique since the left hand
side of (3.1) is strictly increasing in n. Given this value of n, the equilibrium
values of xi and Gj are determined by equations (2.1) and (2.2).
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The previous equilibrium, can be regarded as a fixed point of a dynamic process
in which the rate of change in the number of entrepreneurs is an increasing function
of the difference between Bi and Πi. Let
dm
dt
= h(Bi −Πi)
where h( ) is sign-preserving. Now, we have the following:
Proposition 2: The equilibrium of the single ownership is globally stable.
Proof: In the proof of Proposition 1 it was shown that Bi−Πi was increasing
in n, and so it is decreasing on m. Since h( ) is sign preserving it follows that dmdt
is a decreasing function of m and this proves the result.
Once we know that equilibrium is unique and stable we can embark upon the
job of analyzing the determinants of the relative size between rent-seeking and
productive activities. A measure of this size is the ratio between V and aggregate
production denoted by x ≡
Pm
i=1 xi. This ratio will be denoted by u.
u ≡ V
x
=
eβt∗x
x
= eβt∗ = eβ
α(a− g)
1 + α
=
eβαb
1 + α
a− g
b
. (3.2)
Notice that the determinants of u (the relative size of rent-seeking) and n (the
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number of rent-seekers) are different. The latter is determined in (3.1) above. By
plotting the values of the equation (3.1) against n and shifting the curve according
to the changes in the parameters we see that n depends positively on e, β, α, θ
and N and negatively on γ and . Notice that n is independent of a, b, c and g.
But u depends on eβ, α and (a− g) and is independent of , γ, θ, b, N and c, see
(3.2) above. The effects of e and β are what we expect: For instance a decrease
in e (i.e. a decrease in the enforcement of the law that provides a legal cover to
rent-seeking), decreases the relative size of it. However the effects of α and (a−g)
on u are not that intuitive:
du
dα
=
αbeβ
(1 + α)2
a− g
αb
> 0⇔ α > 0⇔ b > 0.
du
d(a− g) =
eβα
1 + α
> 0⇔ α > 0⇔ b > 0.
The effect of α on u depends on the impact of α on t∗ since u = eβt∗. Under
isoelastic demand (α < 0) an increase of α reduces u because this change makes
the demand curve more elastic and this makes it more difficult to extract taxes: If
b > 0 an increase in αmakes demand less elastic and this increases the possibilities
for levying taxes and the possibilities to finance rent-seeking. The explanation of
the effect of (a−g) on u follows the previous lines because the effect of (a−g) over
21
u takes the same sign as the effect of (a−g) on t∗ since u = eβt∗. The bottom line is
that the effect of technological progress on u can not be forecasted unless we have
a good estimate of the form of demand functions.15 It is perfectly possible that
technical progress reduces or increases rent-seeking. The latter effect is similar
to what is called the ”Dutch disease” in which an increase in endowments lowers
income because it increases rent-seeking (Baland and Francois (2000) and Torvik
(2002)). All these findings are recorded in the following remark:
Remark 1: In the equilibrium of the single ownership:
a) n depends positively on e, β, α, θ, and N , negatively on γ and  and is
independent of a, b, c and g.
b) u depends positively on e and β, is independent of , γ, θ, b, c and N and
sign
du
dα
= sign
du
d(a− g) = sign α = sign b
Let us now turn our attention to corporate governance. Under this regime
active agents vote the tax rate. Rent-seekers have single peaked preferences with
a maximum at t = t∗. Entrepreneurs have also single-peaked preferences with the
maximum at t = 0. Hence the largest group will impose its most preferred policy.
15According to North (1981, p. 166), productivity increased steadily in the 150 years that
preceded industrial revolution.
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Remark 2: If N > 2, m = N and t = 0 is an equilibrium of corporate
governance.
The proof is obvious: If only entrepreneurs exists, the parliament votes on a
tax rate of zero and no entrepreneur would like to switch to rent-seeking because
he would not affect the decision on the tax rate and the prize does not exist.
Let us now study the possibility that rent-seeking exists under corporate gov-
ernance. If it does, rent-seekers must be a majority in the parliament in order to
impose a positive tax. And if they are such a majority, t∗ will result. In this case,
the number of rent-seekers is determined by (3.1) with β = 1. This equation is
difficult to solve in general, so we will consider two extreme cases: no collusion
(γ = 0) and full collusion (γ = 1).
Firstly, let us assume that entrepreneurs do not collude. This is appropriate
for the example of a kingdom or for a divisionalized firm.
Proposition 3: Suppose γ = 0. Under the following conditions there is an
equilibrium in which t = t∗.
a) eθ > 1 and N >
2e(θ − α+ 1)
eθ − 1 .
b) eθ < 1 and N <
2e(α− θ − 1)
1− eθ .
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c) eθ = 1 and 1 + α > θ.
Proof: For the time being take  = 1. Write (3.1) with β = 1, and γ = 0 as
n2 = e(N − n)(1 + θ(N − n− 1) + α). Rearranging this equation we obtain that,
n2(1− θe) + e(2Nθ + 1− θ + α)n− (θN2 +N − θN + αN)e = 0. If eθ 6= 1,
n =
−e(2Nθ + 1− θ + α) +
p
e2(2Nθ + 1− θ + α)2 + 4(1− θe)(θN2 +N − θN + αN)e
2(1− eθ)
Tedious algebra shows that 2n > N iff 2e(α− θ+1) > N(1− θe). Parts a) and b)
follow from that. If eθ = 1 (3.1) reads (2Nθ+1− θ+α)n = θN2+N − θN +αN .
In this case, 2n > N iff 1 + α > θ. In all these cases the parliament is dominated
by rent-seekers and voting yields a tax rate that maximizes T. , i.e. t = t∗.
Finally, let  < 1. As we noticed in Remark 1 part a) n is a decreasing function
of . Thus if  < 1 the number of rent-seekers increases in relationship with those
in the case  = 1 and the previous result holds a fortiori.
Proposition 3 states three sufficient conditions for the parliament to be dom-
inated for rent-seekers.16 The most interesting case is a). This case holds if the
marginal productivity of the input in the production of the prize times the pa-
16These conditions are only necessary when  = 1. For instance, if  = 0, it is easily calculated
from (3.1) that when N is large the parliament is almost exclusively populated by rent-seekers.
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rameter that measures product differentiation is larger than one and N is large.
The case in which agents collude in the production sector is different from the
previous case. In the latter, profits of entrepreneurs and rent-seekers go to zero
at similar rates. In the former, market price does not tend to marginal costs, see
equation (2.1’), and the gains of rent-seeking are exhausted at a faster rate than
those of producing. Therefore, the relative profitability of production attracts
many active agents and, for large values of N , the parliament is composed almost
exclusively by entrepreneurs. For instance if γ =  = 1 it is easily calculated
from (3.1) with β = 1 that rent-seekers are a majority iff N < 2e(1 + α). If we
think of N as the number of seats in the board of directors -between 15 and 25
in most countries- that inequality requires quite high values of e and α. However
if γ = 1 but  = 0, similar calculations show that rent-seekers are a majority iff
e(1 + α) > 1 which looks reasonable. Our next proposition studies the case of
γ = 1 in general. This scenario is appropriate for a non-divisionalized firm.
Proposition 4: Suppose that γ = 1. The following conditions are necessary
and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium in which t = t∗
a) e(1 + α)(1− ) ≥ 1 and  > 0.
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b) e(1 + α)(1− ) < 1 and N < 2e(1 + α).
1− e(1 + α)(1− )
Proof: Write (3.1) with β = γ = 1 as n2 = (1 + α)(N − n)e(n(1 − ) + ), or
(1 + (1 + α)e(1− ))n2 − e(1 + α)(N(1− )− )n = eN(1 + α).
Solving this equation we obtain that
n =
e(1 + α)(N(1− )− )±p(e(1 + α)(N(1− )− ))2 + 4(1 + (1 + α)e(1− ))eN(1 + α)
2(1 + (1 + α)e(1− )) .
Tedious algebra shows that n > N/2 if and only if N(1 − e(1 + α)(1 − )) <
2e(1 + α).
Summing up, the conditions under which rent-seekers dominate the parliament
depend on the degree of collusion but the general principle is clear: When e and
N are large such an equilibrium exists. If e is small, N should be small too.
We now study other properties of this kind of equilibrium.
Proposition 5: When the parliament is dominated by rent-seekers:
a) The number of rent-seekers is never smaller and the price of output never
lower than under absolute monarchy.
b) If β < 1 the number of rent-seekers is larger and the price of output higher
than under absolute monarchy.
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Proof: Consider again equation (3.1). By Remark 1 part a), n is an increasing
function of β. Since the only difference between single ownership and corporate
governance when the parliament is dominated by rent-seekers is that in the latter
β = 1, the result about n follows. The result about the price of output follows
from the fact that the price of output is decreasing in m and increasing in n.
The logic behind Proposition 5 is clear: when a parliament is dominated by
rent-seekers, all taxes are spent in building the prize, so the size of it increases
and this attracts more rent-seekers. This implies a decline in productive activities
and hence the price of the output increases. An important consequence of this is
that the welfare of workers under a parliamentary monarchy dominated by rent-
seekers is never larger than what they enjoyed under absolute monarchy.17 It may
be argued that this result is an artifact of our assumption that under corporate
governance all taxes are spent in the prize. However, this assumption can be
interpreted more broadly. For instance, if a king is deposed and his property sold
in auction, there is an extra incentive to be a rent-seeker.18
17This is in tune with the Marxist belief that workers had very little to gain with a burgeoise
regime.
18This may shed some light on the fact that in XIX century Spain, too much effort and
attention was spent on the court. The explanation may be that at this time the property of
the church and town halls was auctioned and this provided an extra incentive to become a
rent-seeker. The role of rent-seeking activities in the slow development of Spain in the XIX and
begining of the XX century is studied in Fraile (1991).
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With respect to relative size of rent-seeking activities under parliament rule,
denoted by u0 we see that it is determined by equation (3.2) with β = 1, or
u0 ≡ V
x
=
et∗x
x
= et∗ = e
α(a− g)
1 + α
=
eαb
1 + α
a− g
b
. (3.3)
We see that the elasticity of u0 with respect to e, α/(1+α), and (a−g) is identical
to the elasticity of u with respect to the same variables.
We end this section by studying the problem of which equilibrium is more likely
to occur, i.e. the equilibrium selection. We will assume that when the single owner
is deposed, a provisional parliament forms. This parliament is composed by the
entrepreneurs and rent-seekers under the previous regime. They vote on taxes.19
Our result is:
Proposition 6: Under the following conditions the provisional parliament
selects the equilibrium in which t = t∗.
i) γ = 0, βeθ > 1 and N >
2βe(θ − α+ 1)
βeθ − 1 .
19Another possibility is that the parliament is dominated by workers. For instance, assuming
for simplicity that θ = γ = 1, that those working in the production of the prize will support
rent-seeking activities and those working in the production of the output will support no taxes,
and that votes are proportional to the number of hours spent in each sector, the first group
obtains majority iff 2αβ(a − g) > (1 + α)g. In the linear case this amounts to aβ > g(1 + β)
and in the isoelastic case to −α(2β + 1) > 1. In any case, it seems that the chances for the
equilibrium in which rent-seekers dominate are not slim.
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ii) γ = 0, βeθ < 1 and N <
2βe(α− θ − 1)
1− βeθ .
iii) γ = 0, βeθ = 1 and 1 + α > θ.
iv) γ = 1, eβ(1 + α)(1− ) ≥ 1 and  > 0
v) γ = 1, eβ(1 + α)(1− ) < 1 and N < 2e(1 + α).
1− eβ(1 + α)(1− )
Proof: Notice that e and β enter as a product in (3.1). Thus, all the reasonings
made in Propositions 3 and 4 can be made with e substituted by βe. Then, under
the above conditions, the number of rent-seekers under single ownership is larger
than N/2 and voting will lead to a tax rate of t∗.
Notice that the number of rent-seekers in the parliament will change in the
following periods. Remember that
dm
dt
= h(Bi −Πi)
where h( ) is sign-preserving. If the parliament selects zero taxes, dmdt > 0 and the
number of rent-seekers decreases steadily. In this case we approach asymptotically
the equilibrium in which rent-seeking does not exists. However, if the parliament
chooses a tax rate of t∗,by Proposition5, the equilibrium number of rent-seekers
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(determined by equation (3.1) with β = 1) exceeds the actual number (determined
by equation (3.1)). Given that Bi−Πi is decreasing onm, and that in equilibrium
Bi = Πi this implies that dmdt < 0, so we approach asymptotically the equilibrium
studied in Propositions 3 and 4.20
4. Conclusion
The main conclusion of this paper is that the existence of a parliament is neither
a necessary nor sufficient condition for the decline of rent-seeking; It is perfectly
possible that technical progress makes the levy of taxes more difficult, making the
finance of rent-seeking activities increasingly difficult (Remark 1, part b)), and
that the parliament might be dominated by rent-seekers (Propositions 3 and 4).
In this case, the number of rent-seekers increases under corporative governance
(Proposition 5). Finally, the provisional parliament, may select the equilibrium
in which rent-seekers dominate (Proposition 6). Our paper also clarifies that the
determinants of the number of rent-seekers (n) and the relative size of the rent-
seeking sector (u) are different. For instance parameters like  or c affect the
number of rent-seekers under a single owner but do not affect the relative size of
20”Organizational types generally originate rapidly in a relatively short historical period, to
grow and change slowly after this period” (Stinchcombe [1965]).
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rent-seeking.
From the historical point of view our conclusions cast doubts on the belief that
the parliament ”..controls over the exercise of arbitrary and confiscatory power by
the Crown”, North and Weingast (1989), p. 804. As these authors recognize, ”the
triumph of Parliament raises the issue of why it would not then proceed to act
just like the king” (ibid. p. 817). In the case of the parliament subsequent to the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 some answers are: 1) That ”Parliament represented
wealth holders” i.e. it was not dominated by those living on taxes (ibid, p. 804).
2) The relative cost of rent-seeking under Parliament is substantially larger than
under absolute monarchy (Ekelund and Tollinson [1981], p. 149. 3) The increasing
difficulty of providing enforcements of the laws that protected rent-seekers (Tullock
[1992]).
All these factors can be seen in our model: The importance of the number of
rent-seekers in the provisional parliament (Proposition 6) and the role of  (the
effectiveness of efforts in rent-seeking) and e (the productivity in the production
of rent-seeking) in the conditions for the existence of a parliament dominated by
rent-seekers (Propositions 3 and 4).21
From the point of view of the theory of the firm, our main conclusion is that
21Stasavage (2000) adds to the list the composition and the rules of parliaments.
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we can model corporate governance without any role for mechanism design and
explain the compensations obtained by executives as the surplus obtained either in
the production sector or in the rent-seeking business. In our approach, there is an
internal balance between rent-seekers managers and entrepreneur managers. Even
if those in the first category dominate the board of administration, a situation
in which ”top management may decide that collusion and expropriation of the
security holder wealth are better than competition among themselves” (Fama
[1980]) is unlikely as long as there are productive opportunities inside the firm.
A key assumption in our model is that the single owner or the parliament
can only extract surplus of productive activities by means of a tax on output.
However, very often, corporations extract a large part of the profits made by
divisions (out of payments to the shareholders). In this case total revenues are
tx+ δ(p− g)x, where δ is the fraction of profits that are transferred to the center.
It can be shown that in this case the optimal tax is
t∗ =
(a− g)(α(1− δK)− δK)
(1− δK)(1 + α) , where K ≡
α(1 + γθ(m− 1))
1 + θ(m− 1) + α(1 + γθ(m− 1))
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Also, it is easily calculated that
t∗
p− g =
α− δK(1 + α)
K
which, like the corresponding expression in the proof of Proposition 1, it is de-
creasing on K. Therefore the qualitative features of equation (3.1) are preserved
and Propositions 1 and 2 hold in this framework. Moreover, u remains as in the
main text because
u ≡ βe(t∗ + δ(p− g)) = βe(t∗ + δK(a− g)− δKt∗),
and since t∗(1− δK) = (a− g)(α(1− δK)− δK)
1 + α
, u ≡ βe(a− g)α
1 + α
.
Thus, the findings in Remark 1 still hold in this framework. Unfortunately, the
conditions under which Propositions 3, 4 and 6 hold become too complicated to
shed light on the problem. All we can say is that the analysis made in the main
text is a good approximation when δ is close to zero because in this case the key
ratio t∗/(p − g) is approximately α/K, and equation (3.1) holds approximately.
Of course, Remark 2 and Proposition 5 still hold.
We end the paper by suggesting some avenues of research.
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1: We have assumed that the degree of collusion is independent of the number
of agents. However, the literature on supergames suggests that both variables are
related (see, e.g. Shapiro (1989) for a survey). It would be interesting to have
a model where collusion is an endogenous variable, determined simultaneously
with the other variables of the model. The same can be said about the degree of
divisionalization.
2: The introduction of risk in the model would allow for cases in which, because
events turn out to be unfavorable, bankruptcy occurs. In the case of a corporation,
this may lead to the discovery of the unpleasant fact that part of the corporation
was living on money that, in principle, belonged to the shareholders, with the
corresponding legal consequences.
3. In a dynamic context, it is not clear how the single owner can sustain his
standard of living if, in each period, he has to cede part of his property. This
suggest that this kind of regime might be not sustainable in the long run, unless
a continuous inflow of new resources are poured into the system.22
4: In our model rent-seekers do not perform any productive activity. However,
it would be interesting to model rent-seeking as done by actual entrepreneurs to
stop competition.
22I owe this point to Juan Carmona.
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5: About 300 years ago, most organizations in Europe were run by single
owners, i.e. firms, families, university departments and countries. Many of these
organizations in our present time use voting to some degree. It would be very inter-
esting to investigate if the emergence and eventual dominance of voting procedures
in many organizations in our present day societies have a common explanation.
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